The adverse impacts of regulatory requirements on the entry of generic products in pharmaceuticals have not been well documented. In particular, generic products frequently could not rely on the safety and efficacy evidence submitted by the pioneer firms for post-1962 drug introductions. These data were accorded trade secret status. Consequently, unless the relevant data were publicly available in the scientific literature, an imitator had to duplicate many of the pioneer's tests to gain market approval. Under the new law, a generic drug company need only submit an "Abbreviated New Drug Application" (ANDA). This requires it only to demonstrate that the drug is bioequivalent to the pioneer's product, a relatively low cost experiment.
to demonstrate that the drug is bioequivalent to the pioneer's product, a relatively low cost experiment.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 has been termed the most important legislation for the pharmaceutical industry since the 1962 Kefauver Amendments. Essentially, it eliminates duplicative testing and makes entry easy for generic competitors, while at the same time extending patent protection for future new product introductions. In this paper we analyze its likely impacts on competition in the pharmaceutical industry, the incentives for innovation, and general consumer welfare.
I. The Impact of ANDAs on Market Entry
There is evidence to indicate that the requirement that generics duplicate the pioneer's safety and efficacy tests was a significant and growing barrier to entry in recent years. While clinical studies done at medical centers are often published, in-house animal toxicity studies are not. At a minimum, therefore, generic firms had to duplicate these latter studies. It has been estimated in the trade literature that a new drug application for a generic firm potentially involved expenditures of several million dollars and testing periods of 2 years or more.
In order to gain insights into how important this was as an entry barrier, we analyzed 1983 data on the number of drugs among the top 200 pharmaceuticals with expired patents that also had no generic competitors. Antibiotics and pre-1962 introductions were excluded from this analysis because they were governed by separate procedures that did not require duplicate safety and efficacy testing. We found that 34 of the 52 drugs in the sample with expired patents had no generic competition, or 65 percent of The experience of two leading pharmaceuticals, Valium and Inderal, that have experienced generic competition for the first time this year illustrates these trends. These 2 drugs have lost approximately onequarter of their respective market shares on new prescriptions to generic products selling at price discounts of 20 percent or more. This has occurred within the first 3 months of generic availability. Another leading pharmaceutical, Indocin, has lost approximately half its market share in only its second year of generic competition. These rates of sales losses are far in excess of historical patterns in pharmaceuticals, or what was experienced only a few years ago.
If these numbers are at all representative, the Act has removed a significant entry barrier with enormous financial implications for the pharmaceutical industry and consumers of prescription medicines. In this regard, we calculated that pharmaceuticals with sales of over $2.5 billion in a total market of approximately $13 billion will be subject to market entry via the ANDA procedure during the first year of the new legislation alone. If we take a somewhat longer perspective, 180 of the top 200 pharmaceuticals in 1983 will be subject to generic competition by the end of 1989. This is in very dramatic contrast to the start of the decade when generic competition was largely confined to pre-1962 drug introductions and antibiotics, and " firstmover" advantages were generally strong even for those products experiencing generic competition.
From the perspective of economic welfare, the Act is the source of large potential positive gains along two dimensions. First, it eliminates scientific testing for which there was no valid scientific purpose. Second, it lowers prices significantly to consumers with some elimination of deadweight loss and large transfers from producers to consumers-presumably, a favorable redistribution of income. At the same time, if the Act results in lower market shares and/or lower prices for innovators after patents expire, this could adversely affect the expected returns from R&D and lead to lower future drug innovations. The patent term restoration aspects of the 1984 Act are designed to ameliorate this potential situation. Whether the added patent term on future introductions is likely to accomplish this objective is an issue to which we now turn.
II. Patent Extension under the 1984 Act
The Act provides for an extension in effective patent life equal to the sum of the new drug application review time by the FDA plus one-half the clinical testing time, subject to various constraints. These include a maximum extension of 5 years and no extension beyond 14 years of effective patent life. 
III. The Net Effect on R&D Incentives
As discussed above, the Act simultaneously promotes generic competition and restores patent life. In this section we attempt to estimate whether the net effect on incentives to invest in R&D is positive or negative. Our approach is to take as our Given the uncertainty surrounding the two key parameters (the magnitudes of be and ef ), we provide a sensitivity analysis in Table  1 . Using 10 percent as the discount rate, the NPV for the baseline case is computed and set equal to 100. Three values of patent life restored (1, 3, and 5 years) and three values of net revenue losses to generics (30, 40, and 50 percent) were selected. For the intermediate case (3 years and 40 percent), the NPV is shown in Table 1 as only 93 percent of what the NPV would have been without the Act in effect. In short, for this choice of parameters, the net effect of the Act is estimated to have a moderate negative impact on R&D investment incentives.
Of course, as Table 1 indicates, the net effect of the Act is positive for three cases. For example, with 3 years of restored patent life and net revenue losses of 30 percent, the Act yields a positive effect with the relative NPV equal to 102. Although our choice of parameter values is necessarily speculative at this time, it does seem fair to say that the tradeoff built into the law is reasonably close -the net effect is not obviously favorable or unfavorable to firms investing in R &D.
